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AN ESSAY ON PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
MILESTONE HOME RUN BASEBALLS
Steven Semeraro*
VER the past decade, rising interest in sports memorabilia and
an increasing number of home runs hit by major league baseball
players' have produced an interesting property law question:
Who owns the extremely valuable, milestone home run baseballs that are
hit into the stands? To baseball fans unschooled in the intricacies of
property law-and even to law professors 2-that question has an easy
answer: Whoever catches the baseball owns it. That conclusion rests on a
long standing practice among major league baseball teams to permit fans
to keep balls hit into the stands, including some extremely valuable mile-
stone home run balls. 3
Despite this common practice, the ownership question is more than a
curiosity for sports buffs and property theory geeks-of which I am both.
At least when considering milestone baseballs, the question has non-triv-
ial implications for commerce, public safety, and judicial administration.
Ordinary baseballs are worth about $12. Their modest commercial value
minimizes the likelihood of (1) excessive violence when fans struggle for
a loose ball and (2) litigation over ownership. A milestone ball, by con-
* J.D., Stanford Law School; Associate Dean of Academics and Associate Professor
of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I thank Teresa Gillis, Shaun Martin, Maureen
Markey, Paul Finkelman, and Arnold Rosenberg for their many helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts. I also thank June MacLeod, Dorothy Hampton, and Kimberly Reisman for
their help researching this article.
1. During the first 94 seasons of the modern baseball era, a batter hit 50 home runs in
a single season only 18 times. And four of those 18 were accomplished by Babe Ruth in
the 1920s. From 1930 to 1994, there were only 14 50-homer seasons and no player did it
more than twice. From 1995 through 2002, however, there have been 18 50-homer seasons,
including four seasons each by Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa and two seasons each by
Ken Griffey, Jr. and Alex Rodriguez. Murray Chass, Preview 03; Going, Going, Gone,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, at A8.
2. An extended discussion of the issue on the LawProf internet list serve led to near
unanimous agreement among the participants that a fan has superior rights in a milestone
home run ball that she catches. See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned
Property: Who Owns the Home Run Ball?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2002). Simi-
larly, an article in Tax Lawyer, analyzing the tax consequences of a fan's returning a mile-
stone home run ball to the batter who hit it, declared without analysis that "it is common
knowledge to all who attend baseball games that if you catch a baseball, you are allowed to
keep it." Darren Heil, The Tax Implications of Catching Mark McGwire's 62nd Home Run
Ball, 52 TAX LAW. 871, 874 (1999).
3. While long standing, the current practice has not always existed. For example, as
recently as the 1940s, the Cleveland Indians required fans to return baseballs hit into the
stands. Ken Myers, Game for Anything: Ex-Indians Owner Veeck Pioneered Giving Fans
More Than Just a Ballgame, CRAIN'S CLEV. Bus., Sept. 30, 1996, at B26.
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trast, may be worth thousands or even millions of dollars. 4 Given the
exponentially greater commercial potential of such a ball, one would ex-
pect an increase in the likelihood that fans will employ violent methods to
obtain possession.5 In addition to disputes between fans, the potential for
litigation increases with milestone baseballs because, unlike ordinary
balls hit into the stands, the player who hits a milestone home run may
want the ball returned to him.6 While no lawsuits have yet arisen in this
situation, the potential is certainly there.
Professor Paul Finkelman, like me a fan of the game, has written an
article contending that neither the major league baseball team that con-
trols the stadium, nor the player who hits the milestone ball could require
the fan who catches it to give it back.7 He bases this conclusion on three
possible theories: (1) the traditional property law concept of abandon-
ment; (2) the traditions and customs of baseball, which he calls the "com-
mon law of baseball"; and (3) contractual rights that the fan may receive
when purchasing a ticket, which he calls "statutory claims." 8
Much as I wish that he were right, I fear that Professor Finkelman, like
Eco's Baudolino, has come to see what he wants to see.9 While the doc-
4. Mark McGwire's 70th home run sold for over $3 million. Heil, supra note 2, at 871
n.3. Eddie Murray's 500th home run ball sold for more than half a million dollars. Carrie
Muskat, Where Have All the 500 Balls Gone?, at http://www.mlb.com (Apr. 18, 2001).
5. For example, one high profile legal battle between two fans followed a violent
struggle for control of the milestone ball. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL
31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
6. For example, Mike Piazza commented that his 300th home run ball was "a per-
sonal heirloom for [him]." Andrea Peyser, Piazza's Playing Hardball with 6-Year-Old Fan,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at 25. Piazza asked his team to retrieve the ball. Stadium security
officials tracked down the fan who caught it, retrieving the ball in exchange for some alter-
native, less valuable souvenirs. Wallace Matthews, Ballgate: Mike Was Right, N.Y. POST,
Aug. 12, 2001, at 98.
7. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1611.
It seems obvious that the person who catches a home run ball has taken
ownership of it. Nevertheless, the following investigation and analysis of this
conclusion helps us better understand the nature of property in law, and at
the same time allows us to see how in one more way, baseball mirrors our
legal system and helps us understand the rule of law.
Id. While portions of Professor Finkelman's article are intentionally tongue in cheek, see,
e.g., id. at 1617 ("Cubs fans do keep home run balls on those rare occasions when Cubs
players actually hit them."), overall it presents sophisticated legal analysis that he appears
to take seriously.
Professor Finkelman and I also apparently share an affinity for the New York Mets. See
id. at 1626 n.69. That being so, I feel compelled to point out his omission of 1973 as a great
baseball year. Id. In Willie Mays's final season, the Mets pulled off one of baseball's great-
est comebacks to win the National League Eastern Division. The League Championship
Series with the Cincinnati Reds was punctuated by the dramatic bench clearing brawl initi-
ated by the diminutive Buddy Harrelson when Pete Rose slid hard into second base. The
seven-game, extra-inning-filled World Series between the Mets and the Oakland A's is
memorable for Rusty Staub's underhand throws from right field, A's manager Dick Wil-
liams's virtually endless strategy sessions on the mound, and Reggie Jackson's unabashed
line of praise for the greatest Met, Tom Seaver, which went something like blind people
come to the park just to hear him pitch.
8. Id. at 1619-24.
9. The relevant dialogue between Master Niketas and Baudolino reads:
Master Niketas, the problem of my life is that I've always confused what I
saw with what I wanted to see.
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trinal analysis is admittedly debatable, the instrumental goals that typi-
cally inform the assignment of property rights-protecting public safety
and minimizing litigation-weigh strongly in favor of settling that debate
by placing the superior property right to a milestone home run baseball in
either the home team that originally owned it or the batter who increased
its value, rather than in the fan who caught it.
The first two parts of this article expand on and rebut Professor
Finkelman's property law and customary practice arguments in favor of
fan ownership of milestone home run balls. Each section demonstrates
that existing legal rules do not adequately explain how the home team's
ownership of a valuable milestone baseball, as opposed to a typical $12
ball, is transferred to a fan who catches the ball when the home team does
not intend to transfer ownership. Part III addresses the contract law is-
sue, concluding that it provides the fan's best-though hardly an unassail-
able-claim to ownership. Part IV demonstrates that, under the doctrine
of accession, a batter who hits a milestone home run thereby obtains
ownership rights in it. Part V considers the instrumental concerns that
typically inform the assignment of property rights and concludes that the
interests in judicial economy and public safety weigh in favor of awarding
superior rights in the home team or the batter. While an instrumental
goal of redistributing income from wealthy team owners and home run
hitters would favor awarding the superior property right to the fan, this
goal has rarely, if ever, been used to justify an assignment of property
rights.
I. BASIC PROPERTY LAW CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH
AGAINST FAN OWNERSHIP
Professor Finkelman analogizes a baseball hit into the stands to a wild
animal, namely a whale on the open sea.10 Wild animals in public places
do not belong to anyone. Property law has thus developed rules to deter-
mine how such an unowned animal can be transformed into property, and
this law has sometimes been expanded to cover non-living, but moveable,
resources such as oil.1 Like the animal or migratory resource, Professor
Finkelman argues, a baseball moving freely in the stands should belong to
the first person to capture it.12
While the process of catching a baseball in the stands bears some simi-
larity to the tracking and capture of a wild animal, there is one glaring
[Niketas responded, "t]hat happens to many people."
"Yes, but with me, whenever I said I saw this, or I found this letter that
says thus and so (and maybe I'd written it myself), other people seemed to
have been waiting for that very thing. You know, Master Niketas, when you
say something you've imagined, and others then say that's exactly how it is,
you end up believing it yourself."
UMBERTO Eco, BAUDOLINO 30 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt, Inc. 2002).
10. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1614, 1629-30. The Popov court made a similar as-
sumption. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *5.
11. See, e.g., Westmoreland & Cambria Nat'l Gas v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
12. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1629-30.
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distinction: a wild animal is not owned by anyone, whereas a baseball
already belongs to the home team.13 If a baseball that is hit into the
stands is to become the property of the fan who catches it, there must be
some mechanism through which ownership rights are transferred from
the home team to the fan.14
The law recognizes two ways of transferring property without compen-
sation that may apply to milestone baseballs: gifts and abandonment; but
the elements of neither doctrine would apply when the team has decided
not to relinquish its rights to a particular milestone baseball. While there
are legal doctrines that force transfers of property rights despite the in-
tent of the true owner, the elements of these doctrines similarly are not
satisfied when a baseball is hit into the stands.
A. VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS
One might conclude that property rights in milestone home run base-
balls are voluntarily transferred from the home team to a fan via (1) a
donative transfer, i.e. a gift, or (2) through the home team's abandonment
of its property right in the baseball and the fan's taking possession of it.
While either option could transfer ownership of a milestone ball, both
depend on the intent of the home team with respect to the particular ball
at issue. If the goal is to establish a property right in the fan that would
survive the home team's attempt to repossess the ball, neither a donative
transfer nor an abandonment theory will succeed.
1. Donative Transfer from Home Team to Fan
In the many instances in which fans have been permitted to keep a
baseball that is hit into the stands, one could reasonably conclude that the
home team has given the ball to the fan who catches it.15 A gift or dona-
tive transfer requires two elements: (1) delivery of the chattel from the
donor to the donee and (2) the donor's intent to transfer ownership with-
out compensation. While the batting of a baseball into the stands is an
unusual form of delivery because the recipient is not predetermined, it
could nonetheless satisfy the first element. In order to succeed in trans-
ferring ownership, however, the home team must intend to give the ball
13. When a player approaches a milestone, Major League Baseball, rather than the
home team, may provide specially marked baseballs to enable the milestone ball to be
identified conclusively. Id. at 1614, 1616. For clarity purposes, the text refers only to the
team as the owner of the ball. The same analysis would apply to Major League Baseball,
however, were it the owner.
14. Professor Finkelman recognizes this distinction when discussing why, for example,
a pitcher has no ownership right in the ball even though he has possession of it. Id. at 1613
("While possession may be important here, it is not the determining factor. The pitcher
never actually owned the ball.").
15. In Popov, an argument that the Giants, the home team, and/or Major League
Baseball had given the ball to one of the fans was raised but then abandoned. Popov, 2002
LW 31833731, at *2 n.7 (explaining that the argument had been properly abandoned since
there was no evidence to support it).
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to the fan who catches it.1 6 For ordinary baseballs, teams do intend to
transfer ownership and the donative transfer theory places property
rights in the fan.
In particular cases involving milestone baseballs, however, the team
could prevent ownership from transferring by altering its intent. Instead
of intending to give the milestone ball to the fan who catches it, the team
might, for example, decide to keep it, give it to the batter, or donate it to
the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame. In short, the gift basis of trans-
fer depends on the intent of the home team in each case and would not
provide a basis for the fan to argue that he may keep the ball despite the
wishes of the team.
2. Home Team Abandonment and Subsequent Fan Possession
The theory of abandonment and subsequent possession provides an al-
ternative basis to transfer ownership from the home team to a fan. 17 Pur-
suant to this theory, the team would abandon its rights when the ball goes
into the stands. Since the ball would then be unowned property, horn-
book property law would place ownership in the first person to take pos-
session of it.18
In Popov v. Hayashi, a case involving the disputed ownership of a mile-
stone home run ball, the parties agreed, and the court thus assumed, that
"[a]t the time [the ball] was hit it became intentionally abandoned prop-
erty."'19 Given that assumption, the court properly addressed a dispute
between two fans who each claimed to have been first to take possession
of the abandoned ball. If the ball were not abandoned by the home team,
however, the first possessor would not have rights superior to the owner,
the home team.20 On the contrary, the true owner would retain its rights,
and the fan would be obligated to return the ball to the home team.
21
16. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 39, at 88 (2d ed.
1955) (explaining that to transfer ownership through a gift "requires the exercise of the will
to transfer on the part of the transferor, and if such will be lacking, even though the goods
may in fact pass from the possession of the donor to that of the donee, there is no delivery
and hence no gift"); Allen v. Hendrick, 206 P. 733, 738 (Or. 1922) ("To constitute a gift
inter vivos, there must be not only a donative intention but also a complete stripping of the
donor of dominion or control over the thing given.").
17. Professor Finkelman asserts that a "fan's theory of ownership must be based on
the 'abandonment' of the ball by the management [of the home team]." Finkelman, supra
note 2, at 1618. By suggesting that a home team is prohibited from deciding not to aban-
don a particular ball after it is hit, he introduces uncertainty into what he means by
abandonment.
18. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Prop-
erty, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 669 (1986).
19. Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3 (citing generally Finkelman, supra note 2).
20. Professor Finkelman recognizes this point. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1631. "A
well known case asserts that it 'is wholly at variance with our views of right and justice' if a
pet bird 'should accidentally escape from its cage to the street, or to a neighboring house,
the first person who caught it would be its owner."' Id. (quoting Manning v. Mitcherson,
69 Ga. 447, 450 (1883)).
21. "The finder of lost goods does not gain title thereto as against the owner, if the
latter be discovered." BROWN, supra note 16, § 11. "[A] finder [of a chattel] who appro-
2003] 2285
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To be abandoned, the owner of property must dispose of the property
with the intent to relinquish all legal rights to it. In a classic description
of the legal rule, Ray Brown explained that "[t]he question, whether
there is an abandonment or not . .. turns on the fact of intent to be
determined ... in light of all the circumstances. Without the intent there
can be no abandonment. '2 2
Typically, an owner must (1) "cast[ ] away or leave[ ] behind his prop-
erty;" and (2) act "with the specific intent of desertion and relinquish-
ment. '23 A baseball hit into the stands does not satisfy either element of
the test. With respect to the first element, the batting of a ball outside the
field of play does not amount to casting property away or leaving it be-
hind.24 Imagine a backyard game in which my ball is hit into a neighbor's
yard. Neither the neighbor nor the first kid to pick up the ball would
have property rights superior to mine simply because the ball left the
field of play. In fact, the home team's argument is stronger than mine
because the home team likely controls the stands as well as the field. In
both football and basketball, teams regularly require fans to return balls
that go into the stands.25 The movement of personal property from one
area to another when both are controlled by the property's owner thus
hardly qualifies as a means of casting away or leaving behind the
property.
Even if the home team were deemed to have met the first element of
the abandonment test, the fan would still need to establish that the team
intended to abandon the ball in order for property rights to transfer to
the fan. To be sure, the law sometimes infers intent where an owner un-
intentionally loses property, but then makes no effort to reclaim it.26
That determination, however, would require some passage of time.27 The
short interval between the batting of the ball and its arrival in the stands
would surely be insufficient. Proof of actual intent to abandon the ball
would thus be required, but would necessarily be impossible to prove if
the home team promptly reclaimed the ball from the fan who caught it.
B. FORCED TRANSFERS
There are instances in which limited property rights are transferred
from one private party to another even though the original owner did not
priates to his own use property known to belong to another would undoubtedly be guilty of
a conversion." Id. § 15.
22. Id. § 6.
23. Id.
24. Id. (explaining that the owner of a movable chattel "should have the right to assert
its title even though" the chattel should move from the owner's real property to the prop-
erty of another).
25. Cf Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1622 (noting the situation may be different in
hockey).
26. BROWN, supra note 16, § 6.
27. See id. ("The intent to abandon, vel or non, is harder to determine, however, when
there is no positive evidence thereof, and the finding as to intent depends upon the prior
owner's failure after a lapse of time to take steps to reclaim his property.").
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intend the transfer. None of them apply here. Those who take posses-
sion of property for long periods of time may acquire ownership rights by
adverse possession. But that doctrine requires years of possession.28 The
few moments a fan may control a ball before it is taken by security offi-
cials surely would not give the fan ownership rights under the doctrine of
adverse possession.29
The owners of landlocked parcels may sometimes compel an easement
by necessity from a neighboring landowner. 30 But there is no necessity
compelling the transfer of ownership in a milestone baseball.
A somewhat more plausible argument would be that a fan, by purchas-
ing a ticket, obtains an irrevocable license to keep milestone balls. A
license to use certain property, which is typically revocable at the discre-
tion of the property owner, may become irrevocable irrespective of the
intent of the owner if (1) the license holder invests a substantial amount
in reliance on the license and (2) the property owner observes this invest-
ment being made and fails to exercise her right to revoke the license.31
Because a fan has only a revocable license entitling her to a seat at the
ball park to enjoy the game,32 any ancillary right normally associated with
a seat is likely to be revocable as well. Indeed, the cases finding irrevoca-
ble licenses to use real property generally arise where the licensee was
employing the license to serve some property that it unquestionably
owned. The case law does not support the right of a licensee to take
possession of personal property that never belonged to the licensee.
28. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y.
1991) (holding that the adverse possession period does not start to run until the true owner
makes a demand for return of property). Some jurisdictions reach the same result through
a discovery rule that awards ownership to a possessor who controls a chattel for a sufficient
period of time after a reasonably diligent true owner would have discovered that her chat-
tel was possessed by a particular person. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872
(N.J. 1980).
29. The doctrine of adverse possession is sometimes justified by the claim that individ-
uals build up attachment to particular pieces of property over time, meaning true owners
have an obligation to assert their rights within a reasonable time or forfeit them. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). A fan who
catches a ball that is taken from her moments later does not have time to build up such an
attachment.
30. For example, some states enable an owner of a landlocked parcel to condemn an
easement over another's property. Siemsen v. Davis, 998 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2000) ("Arizona's private condemnation statute, A.R.S. § 12-1202 (1994), permits a land-
locked private landowner to condemn a 'private way of necessity' across lands of another
upon showing a 'reasonable necessity."'); L & M Prof'l Consultants, Inc. v. Ferreira, 146
Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1052 (1983) ("In these statutes the Legislature empowered private
property owners to acquire utility easements by eminent domain."); Kellett v. Salter, 261
S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ga. 1979); Shields v. Garrison, 957 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
("Under the Washington Constitution, article I, section 16, private persons may exercise
eminent domain power to condemn private ways of necessity.").
31. See, e.g., Dority v. Hiller, 986 P.2d 636, 639 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Holbrook v. Tay-
lor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ky. 1976).
32. In re Gorodess, No. 01-17854MSK, 2001 WL 1676939, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 31,
2001) ("Because ticket rights and renewal privileges are not accompanied by any interest
in the real property where the sporting event is held, they constitute bare, revocable li-




Even if the greater power to revoke the seat license did not ipso facto
include the lesser power to take back a milestone baseball hit into the
stands, the irrevocable license doctrine would nonetheless fail to apply.
One might argue that the fan has invested in the ticket, relying on the
standard practice that fans are entitled to keep balls that they catch. But
people generally do not attend a ball game primarily because of the possi-
bility of catching a baseball. Fans go to enjoy the game. Assuming for
the sake of argument that a particular fan could establish that he pur-
chased a ticket to a game primarily to get a chance to catch a milestone
home run ball, the investment in a single game ticket is unlikely to be
substantial enough to trigger a right to an irrevocable license.33
In the case of season ticket holders, the amount of money invested may
well be substantial; however, the fan would be hard pressed to demon-
strate that the season ticket price was invested in reliance on a right to
keep milestone baseballs. The odds of catching any ball, much less a
milestone ball, are so low that it is implausible to believe that anyone
would invest such a substantial amount in their license to attend baseball
games in reliance on their right to keep milestone baseballs. 34
II. THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE AND PRACTICE
Major league baseball teams have long allowed fans to keep baseballs
hit into the stands, and there are plausible arguments for why it makes
commercial sense for them to maintain this practice.35 Professor
Finkelman labels this custom a part of the "common law of baseball"; and
he argues that it compels a court to recognize a property right in a fan
who catches a milestone baseball even if the home team does not intend
to abandon its property rights with respect to that particular ball. This
law would dispense with a showing of actual intent-the critical defini-
33. An imaginable exception would be a fan who purchases a large block of tickets to
increase the chances of catching a baseball hit into the stands:
[Charlie] Sheen bought all the seats behind the left field fence of Anaheim
Stadium for [a] game between the California Angels and Detroit Tigers in
hopes of catching a ball. He sat with three friends on an aisle about 20 rows
back, pounding a glove in anticipation of a home run that never came.
He saw the Angels win 4-3, though he never came in contact with a ball.
"Anybody can catch a foul ball. I want to catch a fair ball," Mr. Sheen said.
He chose to set himself apart from the crowd because "[He] didn't want to
crawl over the paying public. [He] wanted to avoid the violence."
People, Places, & Things in the News, SOUTHCOAST TODAY, April 18, 1996, at http://
www.s-t.com/daily/04-96/04-21-96/zpeople.htm#XINDEX3 (last visited July 11, 2003).
Such a fan, however, would be unlikely to obtain such a large block of tickets for any game
in which a milestone ball was reasonably likely to be hit.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 4.1 cmt. g (2000) ("The ex-
pectations that create the servitude also define its scope and terms. The relevant expecta-
tions are those that reasonable people in the position of the landowner and the person who
relied on the grant of permission or representation would have had under the
circumstances.").
35. The public relations value of permitting fans to keep balls hit into the stands, and
even encouraging players to occasionally toss balls into the stands, far outweighs the value
of the baseballs.
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tional factor in the concept of abandonment-in order to create a legal
fiction of constructive abandonment. 36
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, there is
no such thing as the common law of baseball. There is no legal preceden-
tial value embodied in standard practice. The common law is law that is
found, uncovered, recognized, or made by judges applying the facts of the
case before them to the facts of prior analogous cases. A common prac-
tice outside the scope of decisional law is not legal precedent compelling
a decision in accord with that practice. 37
Second, even if a court were inclined as a prudential matter to give
substantial weight to a long standing practice at a sporting event, the
practice of allowing fans to keep extremely valuable milestone baseballs
is not so long standing. While fans have for some time been permitted to
keep the baseballs that they catch in the stands,38 until relatively recently
virtually all of those baseballs were worth about $12. The practice of al-
lowing fans to keep valuable milestone baseballs has a much shorter his-
tory. Only in the past decade have milestone baseballs generated the sort
of value that they now command.39
Third, even if the practice of allowing fans to keep milestone home run
balls was well established, one would have to take into account a number
of competing common baseball practices. For example, the home team
36. Professor Finkelman's discussion is confusing, however, because he suggests that
the home team constructively abandons baseballs hit into the stands because team officials
"know where [the ball] is, and [do] not go after it." Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1621.
While that fact is probably better viewed as evidence of an actual intent to abandon rather
than a fact supporting a claim of constructive abandonment, it would be a reasonable way
to conclude that a fan had acquired ownership rights in a ball that she caught in the stands
and was allowed to keep. The problem arises when the home team takes the ball back.
Professor Finkelman reaches the same conclusion that the fan should be the owner. Id. at
1625 (describing the New York Mets' recovery of Mike Piazza's 300th home run baseball as
"strong-arm robbery" and commenting that the fan "would have a solid case against the
Mets for conversion").
37. Indeed, perhaps the most famous of the wild animal cases reached a legal result
that was precisely the opposite of the standard practice. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (awarding property rights in a fox to the first possessor despite the
practice that the pursuer should be entitled to catch the fox).
38. See supra note 3. An interesting anecdote indicative of older conceptions of the
status of baseballs that went into the stands involves Johnny Evers recollection of the 1908
National League playoff game between the Chicago Cubs and the New York Giants. In
the bottom of the ninth inning with the game tied and a runner on second, the following
incident occurred: Fred Merkle of the Giants hit a ground-rule double into the stands.
Merkle got as far as a little past first base and, seeing the celebration begin in the dugout
and the fans starting to exit the stands, he turned and headed for the dugout. Second
baseman Johnny Evers, seeing Merkle had failed to touch second base, dashed for the
bleachers and asked the gentleman in the bleachers who had caught the ball to hand it
over. When he refused, Evers bopped him on his derby hat, grabbed the ball, and threw it
to Joe Tinker, the shortstop, who stepped on second base. The umpire called Merkle out.
In the pandemonium that ensued, the game had to be called. Two weeks later the Cubs
defeated the Giants 4-2, and went on to defeat the Detroit Tigers and Ty Cobb in the
World Series, the last time the Cubs ever won a World Series. JOHN P. CARMICHAEL, MY
GREATEST DAY IN BASEBALL AS TOLD TO JOHN CARMICHAEL 37 (A.S. Barnes ed., 1945).
39. See discussion supra notes 1, 4.
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typically permits a player who achieves a milestone to keep the ball. 40
When a pitcher strikes out his 3000 batter, for example, the home team
gives him the ball. There is thus a conflict in common practices. When an
ordinary ball is hit into the stands, the fan who catches the ball may keep
it. When a milestone ball is not hit into the stands, the player achieving
the milestone gets to keep it. These common practices conflict with each
other when a player hits a milestone ball into the stands.
This conflict may be resolvable with reference to another common
baseball practice. Less often than ordinary baseballs, but more often
than milestone baseballs, a piece of baseball equipment worth substan-
tially more than $12 makes its way into the stands. Most commonly, a
player will lose control of a bat and the momentum of his swing will carry
the bat into the stands. In these cases, the customary practice is to re-
quire the fan to return the bat to the player, usually in return for another
souvenir. This practice is consistent with general practices across sports.
Teams often require fans to return valuable equipment that goes into the
stands, such as footballs and basketballs, but not less expensive items
such as hockey pucks.41 Considering all three common practices, a rule
that required the return of valuable milestone balls to the player with the
fan receiving an alternative souvenir would best harmonize the three
practices.
Professor Finkelman distinguishes situations in which bats go into the
stands because they can still be used to play the game while baseballs that
go into the stands cannot.42 That explanation is neither factually nor le-
gally correct. Factually, a long drive that is caught at the wall by an out-
fielder is thrown back to the pitcher and continues in play. There is no
reason why a ball that is hit just over the fence and caught cleanly by a
fan could not be put back in play. And just as a ball hit into the stands
might suffer damage that leaves it unplayable, a bat that flies into the
stands is in danger of chipping or cracking in a way that would make it
unusable.
As a matter of law, usability has nothing to do with the assignment of
property rights. Much to my chagrin, I have no less of a property right in
my old, worn out tires than I had in them when they were new. Their
lack of usability is irrelevant. Were I to put the old tires in the street in
front of my house, one might reason that I intended to abandon them
because they had become unusable. But that inference rests on a tacit
40. An interesting anecdote regarding a player's interest in milestone baseballs con-
cerns the infamous Richie "Call Me Dick" Allen. Banished from the Phillies, Cardinals,
and Dodgers for his somewhat flaky antics, the slugger found a comfortable home with the
Chicago White Sox. In the early 1970s, Allen produced two and a half wonderful seasons
for the Chisox before injuries and age reduced his production. During the glory days,
Allen once struck out and then asked for and received the ball as a keepsake because he
considered the strikeout to be a personal milestone.
41. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1622.
42. Id. at 1620-21, 1623.
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assumption that unusable tires have no value to me, and therefore my act
of placing them on the street is strong evidence of abandonment.
When dealing with an unusable but nonetheless extremely valuable
milestone baseball, however, reasonable inferences about intent cannot
be drawn from usability. One must look directly to the value of the item
for insight into likely intent. An ordinary baseball or hockey puck has
little value, so teams abandon them when they go into the stands. A foot-
ball or basketball has considerably more value, so teams do not abandon
them. A used bat is even more valuable to a player; therefore he does
not intend to abandon his bat when it leaves the field. A milestone base-
ball has substantially more value than any of these items. The home team
would thus be highly unlikely to intend to abandon it. a3
Professor Finkelman also argues that there is a difference between
milestone baseballs, on the one hand, and footballs, basketballs, and
baseball bats, on the other, in that only the former is intentionally hit into
the stands.44 As an initial matter, that statement is not quite accurate.
The ball is intentionally hit over the outfield fence. It is purely a matter
of happenstance, however, as to whether the ball lands in an area to
which fans have access. Many home runs land in areas between the out-
field fence and the stands that are inaccessible to fans.
More importantly from the perspective of property rights, the field of
play is as meaningless as usability. The home team has as much of a
property right to the stands as to the field of play itself. And there is
nothing unusual about the grant of a license to enjoy a particular place
that does not include a profit to remove valuable souvenirs located there.
Parks and beaches often prohibit the removal of rocks or artifacts found
by those with a license to use the area, and one granted a license to tour a
winery is not entitled to partake freely, even if wine may be spilling from
a vat.
III. CONTRACT LAW PROVIDES THE FAN'S
STRONGEST ARGUMENT
Some major league baseball teams, in one way or another, communi-
cate to ticket holders that they may keep baseballs that are hit into the
stands.45 Professor Finkelman argues that these statements provide a
43. While I am unaware of a hockey team ever attempting to retrieve a puck from the
crowd, it is unlikely that a milestone hockey puck would ever make its way outside the
rink. Milestones in hockey generally occur when pucks go into the net. Conceivably, a
hockey goalie's milestone save might deflect off the goalie's equipment and into the crowd.
If milestone hockey pucks attained substantial value as items of sports memorabilia, the
save-deflection example would pose an issue similar to the milestone home run ball.
44. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1623-24.
45. Id. at 1610-11, 1621-22. Professor Finkelman finds further support for this argu-
ment in provisions that notify fans that they assume the risk of injury from objects that may
enter the stands from the field of play. Id. at 1610 & n.8. It is unclear why such a warning
would support a contract claim over ownership rights to the ball. For example, the warning
that he cites mentions bats as well as balls, and fans generally are not permitted to keep
bats that go into the stands.
20031 2291
SMU LAW REVIEW
"statutory" basis for concluding that fans own the milestone home run
balls that they catch.46 But just as the common practices of baseball are
not common law, pronouncements by baseball teams are not statutes em-
bodying judicially enforceable rules of law.
These statements could, however, amount to contracts between the
team and the fans through which the team promises to transfer property
rights in milestone baseballs to the fans who catch them. A fan's contract
claim would take the following form: While baseball teams primarily of-
fer entertainment, the right to keep baseballs hit into the stands is part of
the entertainment experience offered. At least when a team explicitly
tells fans that they may keep balls hit into the stands, a contractual right
to keep the ball likely arises.
This contract claim is probably the strongest legal ground that a fan
would have to claim a ball in the face of a competing claim by the team;
however, even this claim is strained in the special case of a milestone ball.
A team could argue that its statements about fans keeping baseballs hit
into the stands-and the reasonable understanding of ticket-holders-re-
late to the 99% or greater of baseballs that are worth about $12. Any
contractual right should therefore stop short of milestone balls.
On the one hand, a court would surely be tempted to conclude that the
agreement says "baseball" and a milestone ball is a baseball. On the
other hand, one should not extrapolate an agreement contemplating $12
souvenirs to extremely valuable pieces of memorabilia. Is a ball a ball
when the value differs by a factor of 10,000? If the contracting parties
actually contemplated the right to keep milestone baseballs as a part of
the contract, one would expect the parties to seek opportunities to adjust
their side of the bargain according to the relative risks and rewards.
More specifically, the home team would be expected to vary ticket prices
according to the likelihood of catching a milestone ball.
In general, ticket prices appear to vary in a manner that is roughly in
line with the likelihood of catching an ordinary ball, but not a milestone
home run. Field level seats between home plate and the bases are gener-
ally the most expensive and generally provide the best chance of catching
a ball, albeit an ordinary foul ball. Seats further from home plate and
higher up in the stadium generally cost less and provide less of a chance
to make a catch. Milestone home runs-comprising only a very small
percentage of the total balls that go into the stands-fall in the seats be-
hind the outfield, which tend to be among the least expensive. A court
could thus conclude that the contracting parties did not reasonably con-
template the inclusion of milestone balls within the scope of the
contract. 47
46. Id. at 1621-22.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, at 385 (1981) ("Where a mis-
take of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the con-
tract is voidable by the adversely affected party."); see also 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 4.10, at 618 (1993) (explaining that "if the parties had materially different meanings, and
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Professor Finkelman analogizes a ticket to a baseball game to a lottery
ticket.4 8 Unlike a lottery, however, a ball game provides entertainment
that is unrelated to the gamble. The point of buying a ticket to the game
is not simply to take a chance at winning a prize.49 Indeed, unlike a lot-
tery, there is no guarantee that the prize will even materialize. The player
might never hit the milestone home run, or he might hit it in an area of
the stadium to which no fan has access. These factors suggest that a rea-
sonable interpretation of the agreement between the baseball team and
the fan does not necessarily include the right to keep milestone baseballs.
IV. THE BATTER'S PROPERTY RIGHT
While a fan's argument for a property right in a milestone ball is tenu-
ous, if not utterly unsupportable, the batter has a claim that rests firmly
on established property law doctrine. According to the labor theory of
property, ownership is justified by the mixing of an individual's labor with
a material good. In its most basic form, the mere act of possessing some-
thing previously unowned requires the labor of the possessor.50 More
often, however, one person will use the property of another to create
something of greater value. In such a situation, the doctrine of accession
awards ownership rights to the creator, rather than the original owner of
the property, whenever the value of the property increases substan-
tially.51 The theory underlying the doctrine is that returning property
that has substantially increased in value to the original owner would pun-
ish the laborer too harshly and provide an undeserved windfall to the
original owner.52
When a batter hits a milestone home run, he combines his labor with
an ordinary baseball owned by the home team to create a ball worth po-
neither one knew or had reason to know the meaning of the other, there is no contract").
See generally Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain
Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123 (1986) (explaining that, contrary to the classical model,
most contracts are incomplete in that the parties do not reasonably account for the full
allocation of risk attendant to all possible outcomes).
48. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1625 ("The ticket to a game is in fact a lottery ticket.").
49. Professor Finkelman argues that like a lottery, more tickets are purchased when
the payoff is likely to be higher. Id. But that fact is explained by the desire of many fans to
see a player hit a milestone home run. Professor Finkelman asserts that "[f]or every ticket
purchaser who catches a valuable ball, there are hundreds of thousands-indeed millions-
who do not. But they buy tickets to games, hoping that they might." Id. at 1626. It seems
inconceivable to me that all but a tiny fraction of the millions of baseball fans who buy
tickets each year are actually influenced in their decision by the hope that they might catch
a valuable milestone home run ball.
50. The labor theory of property ownership is attributed to John Locke. JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 303-20 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967)
(1690). Other philosophers sought to justify vesting property rights based on possession as
a matter of respect for the freedom of individuals to bring an object "within the sphere of
his will." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 207 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963).
51. BROWN, supra note 16, § 24, at 53. For example, by converting lumber into barrel
hoops, thereby increasing the lumber's value 28 times, a laborer was awarded property
rights in the barrel hoops. Id. (citing Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (Mich. 1871)).
52. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 313-16.
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tentially thousands or even tens of thousands of times the value of the
original ball. The labor involved is not just hitting that particular home
run, but also all of the prior home runs that made the milestone ball so
valuable. This increase in value is more than sufficient to trigger the doc-
trine of accession. 53
Professor Finkelman considers, but rejects, the possibility that the bat-
ter's right to ownership could outweigh the fan's right. First, he argues
that under ordinary understandings of the possession theory of property,
the batter would have no rights: "The [batter's] only contact with the ball
was to touch it with a tool (his bat) in an attempt to force the ball to move
away from him .... As such it is hard to subsequently argue, under any
theory of law or possession, that the ball should be 'returned' to the bat-
ter. He never had it in the first place; did not want it; and used all his
might and skill to make it go away."'54
This focus on possession is misplaced because the value of a milestone
ball rests in an intangible quality that the batter imparts to the ball in the
only possible way. If the batter were to take possession of the ball, it
would never become a milestone ball. To say that in creating that value
the batter demonstrates his lack of intent to take possession and there-
fore has no property rights in the ball is like saying that a sculptor loses
any property rights in her creation because she must move away to enjoy
its beauty.55
Professor Finkelman does consider whether the batter might acquire
rights based on what he calls a "'value added' interest. ' 56 But he rejects
this argument because the batter, unlike an artist, "has not added any-
thing of his own to the ball." v57 The cases awarding ownership rights
through accession, however, do not require the laborer to add something
other than labor. A skilled laborer who turns grass into hay or mud into
bricks contributes nothing but labor.58 The batter surely does the same, if
53. See Walch v. Beck, 296 N.W. 780, 783 (Iowa 1941) (value increased 30 to 40 times);
see also Ron Borges, Battle of Ball from Bonds' 73rd HR is Silly (Oct. 2001) (asserting that
the batter should have some property rights in a milestone home run ball), at http://
www.msnbc.com; cf. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 312-16 (value increased 28 times).
Because the batter is employed by his team and hits the milestone home run in the
course of his employment, his property right in the milestone ball may transfer to the team,
depending on the terms of his contract. Cf. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co., 149
U.S. 315, 320 (1893) (recognizing that an express contract is needed to transfer property
rights in an invention from an employee to an employer); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lock-
wood, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421, 428 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("It is the unanimous rule that the
mere existence of an employer-employee relationship is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
entitle the employer to partake of the benefits of the employee's inventive genius.").
54. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1612.
55. Cf. Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 507 (Conn. 1871) (holding that a laborer
who found abandoned and "comparatively worthless" property "and greatly increase[d] its
value by his labor" does not lose his right to the property by failing to take immediate
possession).
56. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1612.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Lewis v. Courtright, 41 N.W. 615,616 (Iowa 1898); Hamilton v. Rock, 191
P.2d 663, 668 (Mont. 1948); Baker v. Mersch, 45 N.W. 685, 685 (Neb. 1890); Carpenter v.
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not more. By hitting the baseball, the batter creates a connection be-
tween the baseball and his reputation; without the connection the ball
would not be nearly so valuable. An artist sketching with someone else's
pencil does no more than the batter: the talented artist touches the paper
with her reputation, creating value in the paper. In each case, the individ-
ual's effort created a connection between the individual's reputation and
the tangible article, significantly increasing the value of the tangible ob-
ject. The only basis to distinguish the two is that the artist leaves some-
thing tangible-graphite on the paper-while the batter merely
temporarily distorts the shape of the ball. But property need not be tan-
gible. Returning to a sculptor, what does she leave of her own on the
wood?
Rejecting the artist analogy, Professor Finkelman compares the batter's
relationship to the ball to the relationship between a celebrity and a place
that the celebrity has frequented. 59 An inn where George Washington
slept may increase in value, Professor Finkelman argues, but that does
not give Washington any property rights in the inn. There are at least two
grounds on which to distinguish the batter who hits a milestone home run
from the celebrity who sleeps at an inn. First, while the batter uses both
talent and history to add value to the baseball, the celebrity uses only
history to add value to the inn. The skills that made the celebrity famous
played no direct role in increasing the value of the place where the celeb-
rity slept. By contrast, the batter uses his skills directly in adding value to
the ball.
Second, there is a dramatic difference in magnitude. The intrinsic
value of the baseball is only a tiny fraction of the value of a milestone
ball. By contrast, the intrinsic value of an inn will typically far exceed any
increase in value created by the celebrity who spent a night there. It is
precisely the magnitude of the increase in value that triggers the acces-
sion doctrine with respect to the batter who hits a milestone home run,
but not with respect to the celebrity who stays at a particular hotel.
V. INSTRUMENTALISM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property rights are instrumental tools that advance social goals. While
legal treatises tend to focus on the technical rules of possession, there is
little doubt that common law judges took instrumental goals into account
in deciding what would constitute possession sufficient to confer owner-
ship rights in particular circumstances. 60 In the whaling cases that Profes-
Lingenfelter, 60 N.W. 1022, 1023-24 (Neb. 1894); Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55
Tex. Civ. App. 632, 634-45, 119 S.W. 333, 334-35 (1909, no writ).
59. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1612.
60. Justice Holmes explained how common law judges upheld at least three means of
determining ownership of whales that a boat harpoons, but does not capture: (1) the first
to capture the whale receives exclusive ownership; (2) the whale is divided between the
first to harpoon and the first to capture; and (3) the first to harpoon receives exclusive
rights as long as they are claimed before the whale is cut. HOLMES, supra note 50, at 168.
As Justice Holmes explained, these decisions were obviously intended to minimize disputes
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sor Finkelman cites, for example, common law courts developed a variety
of sometimes conflicting property rules that would enable important, but
different, whaling industries to operate efficiently. 61 Some courts held
that a whaling ship had to maintain a line to the whale in order to obtain
a property right in the whale, while others held that merely shooting the
whale with a marked lance was sufficient to create a property right in
whales that washed ashore days later.62 Modern law, by contrast, prohib-
its the exercise of many property rights with respect to whales in order to
preserve endangered species.63
Baseball, Justice Holmes's views notwithstanding, 64 is no doubt a busi-
ness. Deciding who has the superior property right in a milestone base-
ball, however, is hardly an issue that would affect the efficient operation
of the business. Instead, the property rights issue with respect to mile-
stone baseballs is a matter of sport, and therefore other instrumental
goals may be more important. 65
In at least one famous sporting case at common law, the court chose to
set the property right in the way that would minimize legal disputes. 66
The dissenting opinion in that case argued for a different rule that would
enhance public safety and minimize damage to property. 67 Both of these
among whalers and, he concluded, "[i]f courts adopt different rules on similar facts, accord-
ing to the point at which men will fight in the several cases, it tends, so far as it goes, to
shake an a priori theory of the matter." Id.
61. See, e.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881).
Unless [the practice of enabling whalers to obtain rights in whales that wash
ashore] is sustained [by the courts], this branch of industry must necessarily
cease, for no person would engage in it if the fruits of his labor could be
appropriated by any chance finder .... That the rule works well in practice
is shown by the extent of the industry which has grown up under it ....
Id. Common law courts recognized the importance of encouraging the efficient use of
property in developing property rules in other areas as well. See, e.g., Keeble v. Hicker-
ingill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Queen's Bench 1707) (recognizing a property right in ducks
attracted to a decoy pond even though the ducks' freedom of movement was unaffected).
62. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 89-93 (1989).
63. See, e.g., International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 716, 74 U.N.T.S. 1953.
64. Justice Holmes drafted an opinion holding professional baseball exempt from the
antitrust laws because it did not constitute interstate commerce. Fed. Baseball Club of
Balt. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
65. The instrumental goals that ordinarily support vesting the finder of lost or aban-
doned property with ownership rights also fail to apply here. In the case of lost property,
finders are given superior rights against the world, except for the actual owner, in order to
encourage finders to acknowledge their finds. With respect to abandoned property, finders
are encouraged to bring the property back to productive use. Neither incentive is neces-
sary with respect to milestone baseballs. The home team would have no trouble retrieving
the ball if it wanted it. And the nature of the circumstances in which the ball goes into the
crowd ensures that the ball will not lay dormant for more than a few seconds. On the
contrary, fans will try to catch balls hit into the stands merely for the thrill of catching
them.
66. In Pierson v. Post, the court held that one must take actual possession of or at least
wound a wild animal in order to obtain ownership rights "for the sake of certainty, and
preserving peace and order in society." 3 Cai. R. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The court
explained that requiring less "would prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation." Id.
67. Id. at 180-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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rationales weigh in favor of placing superior property rights in milestone
home run baseballs in either the home team or the batter.
A. JUDICIAL ECONOMY
With respect to legal disputes, a rule that gives superior property rights
to either the team or the batter would be easy to administer and would
minimize disputes. A rule that gives a property right to the fan who
catches the ball, by contrast, would ensure disputed ownership claims as
fans scurried to recover balls hit into the stands. While the law of first
possession is well established, determining what constitutes possession as
a matter of both fact and law is difficult. 68
Professor Finkelman proposes a rule that would award the ball to the
fan who first catches it even if others knocked the ball from her, but not if
she dropped it of her own accord. 69 Such a rule would be hopelessly
difficult to administer and would give rise to endless disputes.70 Even in
the relatively clear case where a fan-to use baseball parlance-got a
glove on the ball directly off the bat, it would often be difficult to tell
whether the fan dropped the ball of her own accord or whether others
knocked it free. As the Popov court declared, "[r]esolution of that ques-
tion is the work of a psychic, not a judge. '' 71 Cases in which the ball starts
bouncing through the stands will be even more difficult. What happens
when one fan, about to pick up the ball, is knocked aside by another who
grabs it instead?
The problem is not merely factual. Articulating a legal definition of
possession in these cases is no easy task.72 The Popov court recognized a
68. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002) ("Possession is a blurred question of law and fact."); HOLMES, supra note 50, at 163-
94.
69. Finkleman, supra note 2, at 1631-32.
70. The now infamous legal battle over Barry Bonds's 73rd home run ball is not the
only possession dispute to arise over a milestone home run. Fuchsia, It's How They Played
The Game, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 1998, at A14 ("Disputes over ownership of some
[milestone] balls hit into the stands by the home-run duo [of Mark McGwire and Sammy
Sosa] have wound up in court."); Major League Log, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Sept.
15, 1998, at D5 ("As of yesterday, three people had claimed to be the owner of the valua-
ble baseball. No one is sure who the rightful owner is ....").
71. Despite a professionally shot videotape of the event, the court in Popov was una-
ble to determine whether Mr. Popov actually caught the ball:
It is important to point out what the evidence did not and could not show.
Neither the camera nor the percipient witnesses were able to establish
whether Mr. Popov retained control of the ball as he descended into the
crowd .... We do not know when or how Mr. Popov lost the ball.
Perhaps the most critical factual finding of all is one that cannot be made.
We will never know if Mr. Popov would have been able to retain control of
the ball had the crowd not interfered with his efforts to do so.
Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3.
72. In Popov, the court explained:
The parties fundamentally disagree about the definition of possession. In
order to assist the court in resolving this disagreement, four distinguished law
professors participated in a forum to discuss the legal definition of posses-
sion. The professors also disagreed.
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pre-possessory interest in a fan who intended to catch a ball hit into the
stands and took "significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of
[the ball, but had this effort] interrupted by the unlawful acts of others. '73
Certainly, that rule of law does not portend to resolution without judicial
intervention.
B. PUBLIC SAFETY
A concern for public safety also weighs in favor of placing the property
right in the batter or the team. Fans often behave irresponsibly, if not
dangerously, in seeking to catch ordinary baseballs hit into the stands.
That behavior is unlikely to improve when a valuable milestone baseball
is up for grabs. Accounts of efforts to gain control of milestone home
runs are punctuated with descriptions of "out of control mob[s]" tackling,
kicking, and even biting one another in an attempt to gain possession of
the ball.74
Professor Finkelman recognizes that public safety is relevant to the ap-
propriate property rule.75 Thus, he argues that fans should not be permit-
ted to knock the ball away from the fan who first catches it.76 Placing the
property right in the batter or the home team would go much further
toward minimizing the "violence and mayhem" 77 that accompanies the
The disagreement is understandable. Although the term possession ap-
pears repeatedly throughout the law, its definition varies depending on the
context in which it is used. Various courts have condemned the term as vague
and meaningless.
Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *34 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at *6.
74. After examining a video tape of the event and hearing the testimony of numerous
witnesses, the Popov court found:
When the seventy-third home run ball went into the arcade, it landed in
the upper portion of the webbing of a softball glove worn by Alex Popov....
Even as the ball was going into his glove, a crowd of people began to en-
gulf Mr. Popov. He was tackled and thrown to the ground while still in the
process of attempting to complete the catch. Some people intentionally de-
scended on him for the purpose of taking the ball away, while others were
involuntarily forced to the ground by the momentum of the crowd.
Eventually, Mr. Popov was buried face down on the ground under several
layers of people. At one point he had trouble breathing. Mr. Popov was
grabbed, hit and kicked. People reached underneath him in the area of his
glove....
The videotape clearly establishes that this was an out of control mob, en-
gaged in violent, illegal behavior.
Id. at *1-2 (footnote omitted); see also Heil, supra note 2, at 874 ("Television highlights of
[McGwire's] prior [milestone] home runs showed fans kicking and punching one another in
mad scrambles for the baseball.").
Bob Milkovich, Cubs fan who was involved in the mad chase on Waveland
Avenue for Sammy Sosa's No. 62 home run baseball [said]: "Now you know
how Elvis and the Beatles felt. Or the running of the bulls .... "
... [P]eople fought tooth-and-nail, literally, for [the ball]. One person
went to the hospital and claimed that a person bit his hand and took the ball.
Major League Log, supra note 70.
75. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1632 (arguing that the property rule should be set so as
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typical scrum for a baseball in the stands. If fans knew that anyone who
catches a valuable milestone ball would be required to return it to the
home team or the batter, the level of irresponsible violence might be
reduced.
C. REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
The instrumental goal of redistributing wealth strongly favors giving
the superior property right to the fan who catches a milestone home run
baseball. The owners of major league baseball teams are all multi-mil-
lionaires, and the batters who hit milestone home run balls are also likely
to be among the wealthiest individuals. Few fans will be in the same eco-
nomic bracket. Awarding the superior property right to the fan would
thus serve the instrumental goal of redistributing income. Perhaps not
surprisingly, this argument is often asserted by those who argue in favor
of giving the fan a property right in the milestone ball.
78
The goal of redistributing wealth, of course, has not historically been of
much, if any, importance to the assignment of property rights. Despite its
personal appeal to many fans, there is no realistic legal basis on which to
conclude that the goal of wealth redistribution should control the assign-
ment of property rights in milestone home run baseballs.
CONCLUSION
Whether the ordinary practice through which fans keep baseballs hit
into the stands is viewed as a gift or the acquisition of abandoned prop-
erty, the intent of the home team is critical. To be sure, with respect to
ordinary baseballs and most milestone baseballs, the home team has in-
tended to transfer ownership, in one way or another, to the fan who gains
possession. If the home team decided not to give away or abandon the
ball, there is no recognized doctrine of property law that would compel
the team to do so. The law does not require consistency. 79
Like most baseball fans, I would like to see fans keep milestone home
run baseballs. While I certainly understand the batter's desire for the
ball, most players who hit a milestone home run can well afford to
purchase the ball from the fan who catches it. From the perspective of
public relations, it may also make financial sense for major league base-
ball teams to adopt that approach.
78. Id. ("[I]f a player wants a ball back, he should buy it on the open market, using
some of his vast salary to compensate the fan for relinquishing a treasure.").
79. For example, a 40-year practice of selling season tickets to a particular fan does not
establish a right to continue purchasing tickets. Soderholm v. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club,
Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (describing a prior unreported case). A law
that did compel consistency would be objectionable on the ground that it would create
perverse incentives against generosity and the abandonment of property that could be put
to productive use by others because of the fear that, once established, a practice could not
be terminated or altered. Cf. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d
370, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that imposing antitrust liability for withdrawing
from voluntary business arrangements will discourage pro-competitive alliances for fear of
liability if the firm seeks to end the alliance).
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As a matter of legal theory, however, the argument that the fan who
catches a milestone home run ball has property rights superior to either
the batter or the home team is tenuous. Neither property law nor base-
ball custom offers strong support for the fan's right. A fan's contract
claim is somewhat stronger, particularly where the team includes a state-
ment on its ticket purporting to permit fans to keep balls hit into the
stands. But even that theory is strained when a milestone ball is at stake.
Standard property law provides a much stronger basis to conclude that
either the home team, based on acquisition and possession, or the batter,
based on the doctrine of accession, have rights superior to the rights of a
fan. In addition to the logic of the arguments, the instrumental goals of
minimizing legal disputes and ensuring public safety-both traditional in-
strumental goals informing the assignment of property rights-weigh
strongly on the side of concluding that the superior property right in a
milestone home run baseball does not rest with the fan who catches it.
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